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Proposition 20,1 an initiative measure approved by California voters in
November 1972, established a California Coastal Zone Conservation
Commission and required it to produce a coastal plan by December 1,
1975. The Commission completed its 443-page Plan2 on schedule
and, as the initiative required, forwarded the document to the legis-
lature for consideration and adoption.
Although Proposition 20 required that the Plan contain, among
other things, a "land-use element" and a "population element for the
establishment of maximum desirable population densities,"3 the Com-
mission's product is notably lacking in concrete designations. 4  One-
third of the Plan's length is indeed devoted to multicolored maps of
coastal zone segments,5 but these maps essentially show existing land
uses and provide no indication of what areas might ultimately be ear-
marked for high-density development or for stabilization. The text
accompanying the maps includes general recommendations on uses, but
usually in a form too general and cursory to provide much guidance. 6
* Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. A.B. 1963,
Oberlin College; LL.B. 1966, Yale University.
1. Formally known as the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972,
generally codified at CAL. PUB. IES. CODE §§ 27000-650 (West Supp. 1976).
2. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMM'NS, CALIFORNIU. COASTAL
PLAN (1975) [hereinafter cited as COASTAL PLAN].
3. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 27304(c)(1), (8) (West Supp. 1976).
4. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302(a) (West Supp. 1976) requires that the land use
element of a local plan designate "the proposed general distribution and general location
and extent of the uses of the land for housing, business, industry, open space. . . ." The
Coastal Plan, however, postpones these designations to a later date. See COASTAL PLAN,
supra note 2, Policy 59, at 79. See also id., Policies 161-62, at 175-76.
5. COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, at 278-420.
6. See, e.g., the excerpts in notes 57-69 infra.
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Rather than making specific land use designations, the Com-
mission proposed several hundred policies and subpolicies of general
application, and recommended an administrative structure for carrying
them out. Many of the suggested policies are not suited to legislative
adoption. Two provide, for example, that "Jt]he State Department of
Fish and Game . . . shall be adequately funded . . . and adequately
staffed,' 7 and that "[t]ransportation agencies shall also cooperate with
education agencies at all levels and the public media to promote
broader public consciousness and acceptance of mass transportation
.... "8 The proponents of the Plan have devoted several months to
translating its salvageable parts into legislative language. The resulting
bills,9 introduced in February 1976, are remarkably faithful to the
Commission's substantive policies, and in fact often cite them by
number and borrow their exact language. Although they contain
blanket declarations that the Commission's Plan shall be the policy of
the state,10 the bills do not attempt to apply any of the designated poli-
cies to specific geographic areas. This lack of specificity is probably
a conscious strategic choice of the Plan's sponsors. Recent experiences
in Vermont and Maine demonstrate that proposing a concrete state land
use plan is politically suicidal because it is certain to stir up intense local
opposition."
Unless otherwise noted, this critique discusses only those substan-
tive polices and procedural structures that are common to both the
Commission's Plan and the bills introduced to implement it. Because
the Coastal Plan is extraordinarily complex, a few of its features must
inevitably be selected as illustrations to convey the flavor of the whole.
The basic theme of this commentary is that the California Legislature
should reject the Plan before it.
I. TWO CURRENT ENVIRONMENTALIST FADS:
AGRICULTURAL LANDS AND THE "ENERGY
OF THE FUTURE"
The Coastal Plan betrays that its authors lack even a rudimentary grasp
of economic theory. As a consequence, although the Commissioners
7. COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, Policy 3a, at 28.
8. Id., Policy 111, at 147.
9. S.B. 1579 (Beilenson), Cal., 1975-76 Sess., introduced Feb. 10, 1976. Its
companion is A.B. 3076 (Sieroty), Cal., 1975-76 Sess.
10. S.B. 1.579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. Pun. R-s.
CoDE § 30003(a).
11. For a one-sided account of the repeated legislative defeats of specific statewide
land use plans in Vermont, see McClaughry, The New Feudalism, 5 ENVMONMFNTAL L.
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claim to be attempting to enhance the efficiency of resource allocation
in coastal areas, 2 the Plan is in fact chock-full of inefficient policies.
The two best illustrations are the program to preserve agricultural lands
and the policies to facilitate the switch to a particular new source of
energy.
A. THE PROGRAM To PRESERVE AGRICULTURAL LANDS
The Commission concluded that
[blecause coastal agriculture contributes substantially to State and
national food supply and is a vital part of the State's economy, the
State's goal shall be to maintain agricultural lands in agricultural
production.13
This policy, which the Coastal Commissioners clearly regard as one of
the keystones in their cathedral, demonstrates that the Plan's pro-
ponents have no conception of the merits of relying on private markets
to allocate resources. They are apparently not alone. The Governor
of California, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., has himself recently declared
"the need to preserve prime agricultural land."'14 In addition, the State
Assembly has passed a bill' 5 that would establish a statewide program
nominally aimed at preserving prime agricultural land (but arguably
actually intended to accord substantial abatement in property taxes to
California's largest rural landowners).1 6 An elementary lesson in land
economics thus seems in order.
675 (1975). The (temporary?) demise of the specific plan for the midcoast area of
Maine is described in Lewis, Coastal Plan Runs Aground, PLANNING, Nov. 1975, at 12.
12. See, e.g., COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, at 4.
13. Id., Policy 30, at 55, incorporated in S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess.,
proposing the addition of CAL. PuB. RES. CODE 8H 30215-21, 30422(f).
14. State of the State address, Jan. 7, 1976, in L.A. Times, Jan. 8, 1976, § 2, at 2,
col. 4.
15. A.B. 15 (Warren), Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 67700-80 and CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 402.3. The bill passed the Assembly
by a 41-36 vote on Jan. 29, 1976.
16. The Warren Bill (A.B. 15) authorizes local governments to recommend that a
state agency restrict specific prime agricultural lands to their current use. If the state
agency agrees, the land is then assessed for property taxes according to its value as
restricted. Although there is a conclusive presumption for tax purposes that the
restriction will never be removed, in fact it can be if, for example, the land is "needed
for urban growth." Local recommendations for removal of the agricultural designation
are reviewed by the state agency. If that agency generally defers to local requests, as it
is likely to do, a landowner with considerable local political influence will thus be able to
reduce his holding costs by having his land designated for agricultural use until it is ripe
for development, and then having it reclassified.
This would then be a more perfect tax avoidance system than the more complicated
1976]
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Land can be used in many ways-for example, for grazing cattle,
growing wheat, or building houses. The businessmen who buy land
for these purposes derive their demand for it from the demand of con-
sumers for finished goods-in these cases, steak, bread, and shelter.17
If a homebuilder outbids a wheat farmer for a parcel of land, the higher
value of the land for residential construction generally indicates that
more consumer satisfaction will be derived from its development than
from its continued use in agriculture. In other words, in a market
economy, factors of production tend automatically to be allocated to the
industries that can satisfy human wants most cheaply.
There is, of course, a catch. Unbridled land markets may not
result in optimal resource allocation where the use of a specific tract
substantially affects outsiders. For instance, certain parcels may pro-
vide magnificant vistas to motorists or replenish aquifers essential to a
municipal water supply; their development might deprive motorists and
water consumers of these benefits. Where externalities of this sort are
present, it may be efficient for government to intervene in the private
land market-for example, by buying up land itself, by taxing or sub-
sidizing various uses, or by enacting mandatory regulations of the type
the Coastal Plan emphasizes. 8 These governmental interventions are
Williamson Act (California Land Conservation Act of 1965), CAL. Govr CODE §§
51200-95 (West Supp. 1976), which sometimes requires participating landowners to
disgorge part of their past tax benefits if they terminate their participation and develop.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51283 (West Supp. 1976).
17. For a relatively comprehensible discussion of derived demand and land mar-
kets, see P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 513-46 (8th ed. 1970).
18. There are other superficially plausible economic justifications for preserving
agricultural lands. Since land in urban use can be reconverted to farming only at great
cost, owners of farmland who develop could make serious allocational mistakes if they
underestimate the future demand for cropland. The risk is reciprocal, however; if
planners overestimate the future demand for food, they will "overconserve" farmland and
thereby deprive consumers of highly 'valued present consumption in return for less valued
future benefits. The loss could be as great either way. The critical issue is who is likely
to know more about agricultural economics-farmers or Commissioners? The Plan
makes one doubt it's the latter.
Nor is there any reason to believe that centralized planners would apply "more
efficient" discount rates than farmers in weighing the importance of future agricultural
uses. Discount rates in private markets reflect the aggregate trade-offs of consumers
between current and postponed satisfactions. Unless the citizens of California are in
need of paternalistic second-guessing of their routine, day-to-day time preferences,
collectively decreed discount rates will only diminish the value of human welfare over
time.
Governmental intervention in agricultural land markets may of course be justified to
counter monopoly pricing. However, there is no evidence of problems with agricultural
monopolies along the California coast, and the Commission itself never invokes this
justification.
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not without cost, however. The costs of intervention may exceed its
benefits, particularly when the most inflexible device, mandatory
regulation, is the one used. 9
The agricultural land preservation policy in the Coastal Plan thus
might be theoretically sound if it were motivated to control externalities
such as the loss of scarce open space in dense urban areas. External-
ity control, however, was not the primary motivation behind the Com-
mission's policy. If it had been, the Commission would have tried to
frame a program to identify and preserve agricultural lands that have
special aesthetic importance, and would not have recommended a
blanket program that would apply even where development would not
injure neighbors or passers-by. Although the Commission does list
the preservation of open space as one of the aims of its agricultural
lands policy, its chief concerns are "[w]orld food shortages, price
increases, and balance of payments considerations .... ,,20 These
latter considerations provide no rational basis for the massive interven-
tion in private land markets proposed by the Coastal Plan. If
developers have been outbidding farmers for coastal land, there must
be many good alternative sites for farming (i.e., agricultural land is
quite elastically supplied), but few alternative locations that developers
believe to be as appealing to housing consumers. A policy barring the
conversion of agricultural lands along the California coast to urban use
could at most microscopically reduce food prices, but might well sig-
nificantly raise housing prices. This appears to have been the effect
of the programs to preserve Hawaii's pineapple and sugar cane fields.21
On balance, a prohibition on the development of aesthetically undistin-
guished agricultural land is an anticonsumer policy. If the Commis-
sioners aspire to allocate productive factors by state decree, they have
missed out on some good bets. For instance, they might prohibit farm-
ers from converting agricultural lands from "good" crops (naturally
Lastly, the policy conceivably could be designed to redistribute wealth from disfa-
vored groups (say, wealthy housing consumers) to favored ones (say, middle-income
tourists motoring along coastal highways). Wealth redistribution, however, is usually
much more efficiently accomplished by means of direct cash transfers. In addition, the
Coastal Plan on balance will hurt the less wealthy individuals who normally are viewed
as the most sympathetic candidates for redistributive programs. See text accompanying
notes 115-22 infra.
19. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 681, 706-10 (1973).
20. COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, at 55.
21. F. BoSSELMAN & D. CALLES, THE QUIFT REvOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL
13-18, 25-27 (1971) (prepared for the Council on Environmental Quality).
1976]
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grown grains?) to "bad" crops (cut flowers?).22
The policy of preserving agricultural lands not only is theoretically
unsound, but also seems to be based on misinformation. Although the
acreage planted in crops in the United States has indeed dropped a bit
lately,23 the principal reason for this decline has been the 50 percent
increase in agricultural productivity per acre over the past 20 years.24
(The productivity gains have been so pronounced that one may in fact
recall federal programs to pay farmers not to plant their lands.) The
proponents of agricultural land preservation claim there has been a con-
tinuing decline in California acreage devoted to agricultural produc-
tion.25 With regard to the basic foodstuffs, this is simply false .2  The
Coastal Plan's proponents seem to be unaware that California's 1975
crop smashed the state's tonnage record for field crops, and also estab-
lished new production peaks for lemons, navel oranges, grapefruit, wal-
nuts, avocados, wine grapes, vegetables, and processing tomatoes. 27 In
short, market forces have smoothly accommodated the urbanization of
Orange County and other prime agricultural lands over the last genera-
tion. As developers converted cropland to urban use, farmers simply
shifted to more intensive cultivation of their remaining land, and started
planting the best tillable acreage that had been in the great reserve
of uncultivated land. A U.S. Department of Agriculture survey in 1967
found that for every three acres actually used in cropland there are two
additional acres suitable for regular cultivation but which are devoted to
other uses, such as pasture or forest .2  The Department sees no "short-
22. This crop may in fact be among the favored. The Commission has denied
applications to build dense condominium projects in order to preserve lands especially
suited for growing cut flowers. See CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION
CoM 'Ns, ANNUAL REPORT 1974, at 6-7.
23. The U.S. Department of Agriculture reports that the 409 million acres in
cropland in 1949 declined to 382 million in 1973. ECoNOMIC RESEARCH SERvicE, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, OUR LAND AND WATER RESOURCES: CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE
SUPPLES AND USES (1974), in SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAmS, 94m
CONG., 1ST SESS., READINGS ON LAND USE POLICY 321, 327 (Comm. Print 1975).
24. Id. at 321.
25. See, e.g., statement of Assemblyman Charles Warren, quoted in L.A. Times,
Jan. 30, 1976, § 2, at 1, col. 6.
26. From 1964 to 1974, the California acreage used for raising field crops climbed
from 6.23 million to 6.52 milion; for vegetable crops, from 0.68 million to 0.86 million;
and for fruit and nut crops, from 1.27 million to 1.50 million. See 1966 CALIFORm
STATISTICAL ABSTRACr 124, 126, 128; 1975 CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRAT 85-86, 90.
27. L.A. Times, Jan. 27, 1976, § 2, at 6, col. 1.
28. ECONOMIC REsEARCH SERVCE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, OUR LAND AND
WATER RESOURCES: CURRENT AND PRospECIVE SuPrPLIEs AN USES (1974), in SENATE
COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAiRs, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., READiNGS ON LAND
USE POLICY 321, 341 (Comm. Print 1975).
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age" of cropland.29 Hopefully, California politicians also will soon
recognize the absurdity of general programs to preserve all prime
agricultural lands.
B. THE "ENERGY OF THE FuTuRE"
The Plan's energy -policies also demonstrate the woeful lack of under-
standing of a market economy possessed by the Commissioners and
their staff. If the relative prices of the traditional fossil fuels-oil, coal,
and natural gas-rise in the years ahead, there will no doubt be some
shifting to alternative sources of energy. Which alternatives will prove
to be the most efficient substitutes? Nuclear energy? Oil shale?
Geothermal energy? Tidal energy? Wind energy? The Coastal Com-
missioners devoted much thought to this riddle and eventually divined
the fuel of the future: solar energy. They find this energy source par-
ticularly appealing, because it poses the "fewest environmental prob-
lems" and is unlimited in supply.30
The Coastal Plan includes authorization for a two-step program to
reap the benefits of the revelation that solar energy is the fuel of the
future. One would prepare the stage for the Prophet, and the other
would command his worship. First, beginning in mid-1977, the Coastal
Plan would allow the Commission to require that all new structures built
in the coastal area be designed to facilitate their easy conversion at a
later date to heating systems substantially based on solar sources.3'
Second, if the Plan were adopted, the Coastal Commission would be
authorized to declare when "an effective delivery system for solar-
assisted heating. . . exists in California," 2 i.e., when solar heating sys-
tems are "comparable to conventional systems in costs over the life of
the systems . . . ."I After the date of that declaration, solar-assisted
heating systems would have to be installed both on all structures subse-
quently built (or substantially remodeled) in the coastal area,34 and
also on all the "prepared" structures required to be designed for easy
conversion."5 (The ironic result of these provisions might be that
29. "[W]e are in no danger of running out of farmland." Id. at 321.
30. COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, at 101.
31. Id., Policy 75(c)(1), at 109-10. The bills contain a specific endorsement of
all of Policy 75, but prudently decline to describe its contents. See S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal.,
1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30251. See also id.,
proposed § 30422(m).
32. COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, Policy 75(a), at 108.
33. Id.
34. Id., Policy 75(b), at 109.
35. Id., Policy 75(c) (2), at 110.
19761
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solar equipment would first be required in a portion of California that
receives less sun than most.36) To alleviate possible hardships from
these policies, the Plan does require that public hearings precede their
adoption and also authorizes variances from the requirement.8"
Solar energy may indeed prove to be one of the most efficient
sources of energy. But there is certainly a chance that the Commis-
sioners have not been (and will never be) able to foresee perfectly
all future technological changes. First, even if the sun's energy
becomes the best source to harness, the optimal technology may involve
large solar power stations run by utility companies rather than the
individual units for each structure which the Coastal Plan contemplates.
Second, the Commissioners seem to ignore a major environmental
cost of solar energy: aesthetic blight. The energy systems envisioned
in the Plan would involve several hundred square feet of southerly
directed flat-plate solar collectors per single-family dwelling.88 Most
traditionally popular architectural styles would be severely tested by this
design element; one finds it hard to imagine collector plates being
attractively integrated with cedar shakes or Spanish tile. The solar
approach would also require strict restrictions on tall shade trees, partic-
ularly in the dense urban areas that the Coastal Plan attempts to fos-
ter.39 The Plan itself admits that 65 percent of existing dwellings could
not be retrofitted to solar energy because they are either shaded by
other buildings or trees, or possess the wrong roof angles.40
Third, and most important, solar energy is at present not cost
competitive with the more traditional fuels used for space and water
heating. The capital costs of installing in a new single-family home
the collectors, storage units, and associated hardware and labor for a
solar system somewhat more ambitious than that contemplated by the
Coastal Plan recently has been estimated at $10,000.41 In addition,
36. The Commission claims that Los Angeles and Orange County coastal loca-
tions, despite frequent fogs, receive a surprising 90% of the mean daily solar radiation
that falls on Phoenix. See id. at 102. Nevertheless, solar heating first would become
cost competitive at desert locations such as Palm Springs.
37. Id., Policies 75, 75(b), at 108-09.
38. See Faltermayer, Solar Energy Is Here, But It's Not Yet Utopia, FORTuNE,
Feb. 1976, at 102, 106.
39. See text accompanying note 44 infra.
40. COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, at 102.
41. See Faltermayer, Solar Energy Is Here, But It's Not Yet Utopia, FORTUNE,
Feb. 1976, at 102, 106. The M.I.T. Solar Energy Working Group has concluded that
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each home must still be equipped with a conventional back-up heating
system.
It is disturbing that the Commissioners even thought about
compelling consumers to use solar energy. If solar energy in fact
proves to be the most cost-effective fuel, the self-interest of builders
and building owners will lead them to adopt it voluntarily. If the Com-
missioners dislike the air pollutions produced by fossil fuels, they should
recommend taxes or controls on those pollutants,4" and not threaten to
place the coercive power of the state behind just one of the many
alternative energy sources. The requirement of a solar energy system
is the sort of inflexible "specification standard" against which architects
and other critics of building codes have fought for years.
The Plan alleges that the policy is necessary because builders "are
slow to adopt and promote any new device that raises capital costs even
if long-term overall costs are lower. . . ,,43 This assumes that those
who purchase buildings are insensitive to the operating costs of various
heating systems, and thus need the Commissioners to look after them.
No effort is made to prove this allegation and it would be difficult to
do so. Electric baseboard units-one widely available heating system
with very low capital costs-are in fact sparingly specified by architects
or installed by builders because they realize that most consumers are
sensitive to the high long-term costs of that system. Moreover, if
consumer ignorance is a problem, the appropriate policy is not to dictate
use of a particular technology, but simply to require builders to disclose
the estimated operating costs of whatever heating systems they install.
In sum, even if the Commissioners have guessed correctly, no
efficiency gains will result from their requiring use of solar energy; solar
systems would be freely adopted by the market. If they have backed
the wrong horse, however, the Coastal Plan will cause a deadweight
loss of welfare equal to the amounts spent and design opportunities
foregone in providing solar energy capability for coastal structures in
anticipation of a Prophet who never came.
"[slolar energy's major potential lies well in the future." L.A. Times, Mar. 1, 1976, § 2,
at 2, col. 5. For a somewhat more optimistic view, see Duffie & Beckman, Solar Heating
and Cooling, 191 SCIENCE 143 (1976). To sample the views of the apostles, see
Commoner, Energy-II, NEw YoRKER, Feb. 9, 1976, at 38, 54-77.
42. Cf. CoASrAL PLAN, supra note 2, Policy 74(b), at 108 (advocating tax
incentives to promote use of nonfossil fuels).
43. Id. at 103.
1976]
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11. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR CONTROLLING
URBAN DEVELOPMENT
The Coastal Plan's administrative structure is also vulnerable to
criticism. The problem can be illuminated by a discussion of one of
the major substantive issues the Commission considered-the location
of future urban growth. The Commissioners have decided to "encour-
age orderly, balanced development that avoids wasteful sprawl by con-
centrating new growth in developed areas with adequate public services
. . . .,4 Scattered development is announced to be inefficient
because it necessitates greater expenditures on urban infrastructure per
dwelling and adds to the travel time of residents. 45  The authors cite
The Costs of Sprawl, a well publicized study by the Real Estate
Research Corporation, 46 to support these propositions. They also
prefer high-density development because it facilitates increased re-
liance on mass transportation systems.47
It is hardly news that the per-dwelling costs' of urban infrastructure
go down as density increases. However, this does not in itself prove
that concentration is more efficient than scatteration. If many con-
sumers prefer low-density neighborhoods to concentrated ones-a
proposition that seems to be supported by the suburbanization of the
United States over the last several generations-then it is possible that
the added consumer satisfaction derived from the free exercise of this
preference more than outweighs the additional costs of servicing some
scattered developments. Where this is so, scattered development is
more efficient than concentrated development. 48 In short, as The
Costs of Sprawl itself iscareful to note, one must consider not only the
costs of supplying various environments, but also the demand of
consumers for them.49
44. S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. Pun. REs.
CODE § 30008. The bill quotes almost verbatim the COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, Policy
1(5), at 25. See also S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL.
PuB. REs. CODE H§ 30242-44, 30422(a)(l)-(2); COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, Policies
59-61, at 79-81.
45. COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, at 22. See also id. at 79.
46. REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP., THE COSTS OF SPRAWL: EXECUTIVE SUMMARtY
(1974) (prepared for the Council on Environmental Quality).
47. COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, Policy 59(f)(1), at 81. See also id. at 145-47.
48. Cf. Lessinger, The Case for Scatteration, 28 J. Am. INSTITT OF PLANNERS
159 (1962); Ohs & Pines, Discontinuous Urban Development and Economic Efficiency,
51 LANiD ECON. 224 (1975).
49. REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP., THm COSTS OF SPRAWL: EXECUrTVE SUMMARY
6-7 (1974):
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The correct pricing of public services can assure that consumer
choices between concentrated and scattered environments are not
biased by government policies. Remote developers thus should be
required to bear-via subdivision exactions and the like-the added
infrastructure costs resulting from their developments; 50 remote resi-
dents should be required to pay in user charges the incremental service
costs they impose. Were these pricing policies in effect, entrepreneurs
could profitably develop remote sites only if some consumers in fact
derived great value from living at those locations. As was its wont,
the Commission declined to take this flexible pricing approach, but
instead chose to condemn scattered growth across the board. This is
simply an instance of one group of individuals imposing their version
of the good life on others.
Closer examination of the Plan also reveals that the Commission-
ers' true policy is not to shift new construction from scattered locations
to central ones, but to reduce the absolute amount of coastal develop-
ment. Despite its claims to the contrary,5' the California Coastal Plan
is at bottom adamantly antigrowth.
The rules governing litigation over permit decisions are one
indication of this unarticulated policy. The bills introduced to imple-
ment the Plan provide that plaintiffs seeking to enforce Plan policies
cannot be required to post bonds5" regardless of the merits of their
claims. When plaintiffs prevail in suits to halt violations of the Plan,
they automatically are entitled to recover their attorney fees from
defendants.53 However, when a defendant developer who was granted
Nor should the results be interpreted as recommending one type of develop-
ment over another. There are too many costs and benefits which have not
been included, particularly those associated with questions of personal prefer-
ences and the revenues generated by different development types.
50. This is actually common practice. For examples of the technique at work, see
City of Glendale v. Barclay, 94 Ariz. 358, 385 P.2d 230 (1963) (sanitary sewer mains);
American-Hawaiian S.S. Co. v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 38 Cal. App. 3d 73, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 897 (1974) (water "feeder" line); Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d 503
(1952) (improvement of access road).
51. The Coastal Plan seeks not to stop growth and development, but to direct
new construction primarily into the rebuilding and upgrading of already-
developed areas where additional development can be accommodated. The is-
sue is not whether there should be new development, but where.
COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, at 22 (emphasis in original).
52. S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. PUB. RES.
CoDE §§ 30602-03. The Commission was silent on the issue of bonds. Proposition 20
contained a provision similar to the one in the bills. See CAL. PUn. RES. CODE § 27425
(West Supp. 1976).
53. S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. Pun. RES.
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a permit prevails over an environmentalist who erroneously challenges
his permit approval, the developer is not only not entitled to recover his
attorney fees, 4 but may in fact be required to pay the plaintiffs attor-
ney fees if the losing plaintiff was serving "the public interest." 5
Second, the regional summaries printed at the end of the
Commission's Plan reveal a definite antigrowth bias. These summaries
contain brief applications of the general policies to specific areas.50
The regional summaries for Los Angeles and Orange Counties, where
development is as dense as anywhere along the California coast, call
for severe curbs on prospective residential development in the follow-
ing communities: Malibu, 57 Venice,55  Marina Del Rey,69 the Los
Angeles Airport area,6 0 the South Bay cities,"' the Palos Verdes
peninsula, 2 Long Beach,63 Santa Catalina Island, 4 North Orange
County,6 5 Newport Beach/Costa Mesa,6" the Irvine Ranch area, 7
CODE § 30605; cf. CAL. Pun. RES. CODE § 27428 (West Supp. 1976); COASTAL PLAN,
supra note 2, General Provision 35, at 190.
54. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1717 (West 1973) (whenever a contract entitles
one party to collect attorney fees, the unfavored party shall also be entitled to collect
them should he prevail in litigation arising out of the contract).
55. S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. Pun. Rus.
CODE § 30605. The Commission did not propose this policy; it was added by those who
drafted the bills.
56. The bills' general endorsement of the Commission's Plan presumably extends
to these applications. Id., proposed § 30003 (a).
57. "The Plan designates Malibu as nonurban .... " COASTAL PLAN, supra note
2, at 246.
58. "The old Venice area . . . should be protected and preserved." Id. at 247.
59. "No intensification of land uses in the Venice, Marina Del Rey, and Venice
Peninsula areas should be permitted . . ." until traffic, open space, and land use
priorities have been solved. Id.
60. "Stable single-family neighborhoods should be preserved and protected from
pressures for recycling to higher densities." Id. at 248.
61. "mhe Plan would limit further increases in housing density until there are
major improvements in beach access, traffic circulation, and the amount of open space."
Id. at 249.
62. Coastal lands should only be used for "very low-density residential projects."
Id.
63. "Residential recycling in Long Beach should be primarily at existing densities
. ... Id. at 251.
64. New housing construction shall be "... permitted only in a few clustered,
planned communities, primarily for the resident population." Id. at 252.
65. "Recycling and rehabilitation of residential areas at the same densities should
be encouraged in most areas." Id. at 253.
66. "Also important will be . . . limiting development as necessary to protect
recreational travel capacity." Id. at 254.
67. "The overall subregional growth should be restricted ... " Id.
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Laguna Beach, 8 and South Orange County. 69 These areas constitute
the vast majority of the coastline in Los Angeles and Orange Counties.
In contrast, the regional summaries identify only two locations in these
counties as appropriate for new high density development: "downtown
Santa Monica,"70 and the "downtown area" of Long Beach.71 Even
if the Commission is using a relatively expansive definition of "down-
town," the net effect of these specific policies must inevitably be a
much lower level of coastal housing construction than would otherwise
result.
The third clue which refutes the Commission's contention that
housing opportunities will not be curtailed is a proposed adminis-
trative structure procedurally stacked against new development. This
requires a bit of explanation. The specific applications of the Plan's
general policies are to be contained in "local coastal programs,"
initially drafted by local governments and submitted to the Commission
no later than January 1, 1979.72 The Commission is given up to 2 /
years (until June 1, 1981) to certify either these local proposals or sub-
stitutes it has itself prepared. 73  The land use controls contained in
certified programs would apply not only to the current narrow permit
area (generally 1000 yards back from the mean high tide line74), but
also to a newly defined "coastal resource management area."7 5  This
latter area is usually much larger. The Commission's Plan76 shows it
extending 5 miles inland in most rural areas, and as much as 9 miles
inland in several midcoast regions. 77
68. "Policies . . . include the maintenance of the higher hills for open space use,
with probably only very limited low-density residential uses in selected locations." Id. at
256.
69. "Faithfully meeting Plan goals .. will necessitate severely restricting residen-
tial growth in this subregion." Id. at 257.
70. Id. at 247.
71. Id. at 251.
72. The Commission termed these "local implementation programs," and would
have allowed 3 years for their preparation. Id. at 180-85. The bills changed the name
and shortened the deadline. See S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the
addition of CAL. PuB. RE.S. CODE §§ 30420-22, 30400(c).
73. S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. PuB. REs.
CODE §§ 30444, 30447.
74. CAL. Pun. RES. CODE §§ 27104, 27400 (West Supp. 1976).
75. See S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. PuB.
REs. CODE §§ 30103, 30401, 30405, 30453-55, 30504(b); COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, at
180, 184, 277.
76. The State Commission approved the boundary lines shown in the regional
summaries. COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, at 277.
77. See, e.g., id. at 339 (Santa Cruz area); id. at 361 (San Simeon area).
1976]
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By potentially extending the planning period to 1981, the pending
legislation would more than double the 4-year development morato-
rium imposed by Proposition 20 to a total of 8/ years. (Frustrated
developers will no doubt claim the prolonged delay entitles them to just
compensation. 78) The postponement of the concrete planning deci-
sions also side-steps Proposition 20's call for legislative review of a final
plan-a wise administrative procedure perhaps, but probably one not
envisioned by many of those who voted for Proposition 20.
Had the Commissioners been serious about redirecting urban
growth from scattered locations to concentrated ones, they would have
provided the proposed State Coastal Agency with authority to preempt
local zoning ordinances. For example, when the Commissioners
divined the need for intensive future development in the City of Santa
Monica, they should have been concerned that that city has recently
been rolling back the residential densities it allows in apartment zones
near -the beach.79 Unless the Coastal Plan provides a method for over-
riding local housing density controls in areas where the Plan calls for
higher densities than are permitted by local regulations, its net impact
must be to dampen the amount of development.
State land use planning programs come in two quite different
forms. Those that provide for state preemption of local ordinances
tend to be favored by the prodevelopment lobby, which sees them as
a means for breaking through local exclusionary practices.80 State per-
The authors of the bills, ever true to their strategy of ducking concrete decisions
that might provoke controversy, do not specifically endorse these mapped boundaries,
and in fact ask the Commission to have a new go at drawing them after the coastal
legislation is adopted. See S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of
CAL. PuB. Ras. CODE § 30344.
78. Proposition 20's 4-year moratorium was held not to constitute a taking of
property in State v. Superior Court (Veta Co.), 12 Cal. 3d 237, 252-55, 524 P.2d 1281,
1291-93, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497, 507-09 (1974). Justice Mosk referred to the moratorium
as a "temporary" measure that did not amount to a taking "at this time." Id. at 255, 524
P.2d at 1293, 115 Cal.Rptr. at 509.
79. See, e.g., Santa Monica, Cal., Ordinance 1012, Aug. 26, 1975 (establishing a
transitional two-family dwelling zone later used as a substitute for apartment zoning near
the beach). Santa Monica officials favor an ambitious downtown commercial redevelop-
ment project. See LA. Times, Feb. 12, 1976, § 7, at 1, col. 6 (West Side ed.). However,
they also have imposed a development moratorium in the downtown area pending
completion of renewal planning. Santa Monica, Cal., Ordinance 995, Mar. 25, 1975.
80. There is no insurmountable legal barrier to the preemption approach. Consti-
tutional home rule provisions have been consistently construed as not protecting local
governments from preemptive state land use controls. See CEEED v. California Coastal
Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 320, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 325 (1974)
(dictum); Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm., - Mass. -, 294 N.E.2d 393,
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mit requirements that merely supplement local requirements are violently
opposed by developers and warmly embraced by the antigrowth lobby.
The latter "dual veto" system was expressly adopted for the planning
moratorium period under Proposition 20,81 and expressly would be
continued by the proposed legislation at least until certification of the
local coastal programs.82 The Reporters who drafted the Model Land
Development Code,s8 the premier piece of legal thinking about state
land use planning, had no hesitation in choosing the preemption model
over the dual veto system.84 In their view, one of the main functions
of state land use controls is to force local governments to accept what
they call "development of regional benefit"--activities that on balance
are detrimental to local interests but, because of spillout benefits, are
efficient from a statewide perspective.88
The California Coastal Plan waffles on the critical structural issue
of whether independent local planning decisions will continue to be
permitted in the coastal region. Some general provisions are consistent
with the preemption approach; they assert that local governments are
to be bound by the Coastal Plan, and must bring their master plans
and ordinances into conformity with it or risk imposition of a Commis-
sion program.8 6  But two other specific provisions, which probably
would be construed by courts as prevailing over the more general ones,
authorize the state Commission to override local officials only when
those officials have made prodevelopment decisions; state officials
apparently will be helpless to overcome local exclusionary practices that
stymie state policy.87
407-10 (1973); Floyd v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 1, 300 N.E.2d
704, 347 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1973); cf. People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5
Cal. 3d 480, 487 P.2d 1193, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971).
81. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 27400 (West Supp. 1976) requires developers seeking
coastal permits to comply also with all other local or state land use restrictions.
82. S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 30500.
83. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (all citations are to Proposed Official
Draft, 1975).
84. See id. § 7-101, Note 1. This should not be surprising. Fred P. nosselman,
the Code's Associate Reporter and one of the leading theoreticians of state land use
planning, is a well-known opponent of local exclusionary practices. See, e.g., Bosselman,
Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole World?, 1 FLA.
Sr. U.L. REV. 234 (1973).
85. See MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ 7-301(4), -304, -502, 8-502, 9-103.
86. S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. PUB. REs.
CODE §§ 30420, 30446; COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, General Provisions 4, 5, 10, at 181,
184.
87. See notes 88-95 infra.
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First, if the City of Santa Monica, for example, does not adopt a
"local coastal program," the state Commission is expressly empowered
only to prohibit Santa Monica from issuing development permits, but
is not expressly empowered to mandate that the city issue them.88
Second, if Santa Monica does produce a local coastal program accept-
able to the proposed State Coastal Agency, the City itself then has ex-
clusive initial jurisdiction over coastal permit applications.80 While the
Model Land Development Code also relies on local permit decisions
to implement state planning policies, 90 the Reporters were careful to
assure that any aggrieved party, including of course a disappointed per-
mit applicant, could appeal the local decision to a state review tri-
bunal.91 The Coastal Commissioners, however, show their true anti-
development stripe by recommending that the State Coastal Agency
have jurisdiction to hear only appeals from local permit approvals, but
not from local permit denials. 2 Even Proposition 20 was not so one-
sided as 'to allow only environmentalists to appeal Regional Commission
decisions.9 A developer aggrieved by a local refusal of development
permission is of course still entitled to judicial review. But in court,
a developer would have to prove that the local decision was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence,94 and might have to overcome the pre-
sumption of regularity often accorded local land use decisions. En-
vironmentalists appealing local permit approvals to the commission
would receive de novo review of the evidence. 95
Despite endorsement by the Reporters of the Model Land
88. S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. PuB. REs.
CODE § 30453 (a); COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, General Provision 10(c), at 184.
89. S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 30504; COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, General Provision 10(b), at 184.
90. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ 7-204(3), -303.
91. Id. § 7-301, Note 1; id. §§ 7-502, 9-103.
92. S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal. 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. PuB. RES.
CODE § 30501(a), controlling proposed § 30515(a); COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2,
General Provision 11, at 184-85. There is an exception; the State Commission will hear
appeals when a local government turns down an energy facility or public works project.
S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
30501 (a).
93. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27423(a) (West Supp. 1976) expressly authorizes
appeals by. disappointed permit applicants.
94. Since (presumably) no "fundamental vested right" would be involved, a trial
court would apply the substantial evidence test. See Strumsky v. San Diego County
Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 520 P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974).
95. S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 30515(c). Under Proposition 20, the State Commission held de novo public
hearings when it heard appeals. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 27423(c) (West Supp. 1976).
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Development Code, state land use programs that preempt local controls
are apparently politically untenable in the long run. Modest programs
enacted in Massachusetts and New York to facilitate construction of
subsidized housing in exclusionary suburbs seem to have since been
repudiated by their legislatures. 9s The most solidly established state
land use programs-in Hawaii, Maine, and Vermont-all explicitly
adopt the dual veto, antidevelopment format. 97  When aroused, the in-
terest groups who want to retain local control over development
apparently are able to wield decisive political influence over the con-
tents of state land use legislation."' The Commissioners' decision to
provide Santa Monica with loopholes for frustrating state policy is thus,
no doubt, wise political strategy. If any plan eventually does emerge
from the California Legislature, it is likely to have been amended to
incorporate an explicit dual veto format.99
In short, the Commissioners' substantive policies on urban growth
would impair consumer satisfaction not only by unnecessarily restricting
the variety of residential environments where development could occur,
but also by sharply reducing the total volume of coastal housing con-
96. The Massachusetts program is described in Note, The Massachusetts Zoning
Appeals Laws: First Breach in the Exclusionary Wall, 54 B.U.L. REv. 37 (1974). By
late 1975, only 600 dwelling units had been built as a result of the act, and the
Massachusetts Legislature had refused to appropriate further funds to run the program.
Boston Globe, Nov. 1, 1975, at 4, col. 1.
The New York Urban Development Corporation was originally authorized to
override local zoning ordinances. In 1973, the New York Legislature not only stripped
it of this power, but also authorized local governments to veto UDC projects that
conformed to preexisting zoning and building regulations. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS ANN.
§ 6265(5) (West Supp. 1975).
97. See HAwNAI REv. STAT. H§ 205-5(a), -15 (1968); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 685-A(4) (Supp. 1975-76); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6082 (1973). But cf. FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 380.05(8), -.06(11) (b) (1974).
98. One exceptionally interesting analysis of the politics of state land planning has
pointed out the critical "swing" position held by local control forces. See Godwin &
Shepard, State Land Use Policies: Winners and Losers, 5 ENviRONMEwNTAL L. 703
(1975).
99. The legislators, however, have a strong monetary incentive to disguise a grant
of local veto power. The Plan's supporters would like their program to qualify for
federal subsidies available under the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16
U.S.C. H9 1451-64 (Supp. II, 1972). See S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing
the addition of CAL. PuB. IEs. CODE § 30010, 30330; COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, at
13-14. To be eligible, however, a state plan must contain "a method of assuring that
local land and water use regulations within the coastal zone do not unreasonably restrict
or exclude land and water uses of regional benefit." 16 U.S.C. § 1455(e) (2) (Supp. II,
1972). Thus the explicit pro-"home rule" amendments that may be necessary to secure
favorable legislative action could assure California's lack of eligibility for federal coastal
planning funds.
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struction. What is especially troublesome is that those who drafted the
Coastal Plan lacked the candor to admit their desire to slow growth and
instead chose to enforce their intentions through one-sided procedural
rules and by implicitly preserving local veto power over state policies.
III. BENEFICIARIES AND VICT[MS
Since the Coastal Plan contains an abundance of inefficient policies, on
balance it will inflict losses in excess of benefits. Some individuals
might of course come out ahead. Members of the planning profession
are one obvious example. The Commission's document asked for prep-
aration of future comprehensive plans for no less than: (1) estuarine
areas; 100  (2) watersheds;' 0' (3) water supply; 02  (4) subregional
agricultural protection; 08 (5) ports; 0 4 (6) open space acquisition;05
(7) restoration of visually degraded areas; 0 6 and, most important (8)
"regional supplements"; 0 7 (9) "subregional plans"; 08 and (10) "local
implementation programs."' 0 9  A second obvious set of beneficiaries
are attorneys, who will enjoy and profit from litigating the correctness
of not only a much larger number of coastal permit decisions, but also
ones governed by scores of ambiguous and conflicting policies."10 Best
treated of all are attorneys for environmental groups; they recover attor-
ney fees from developers when they win, and sometimes even when
they lose. 1
11
Another group of beneficiaries might be the members of Cali-
100. COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, Policy 15(c), at 41.
101. Id., Policy 22, at 49.
102. Id., Policy 23(a), at 50.
103. Id., Policy 32, at 57-59.
104. Id., Policy 117, at 149-SO.
105. Id., Policy 140(b), at 162.
106. Id., Policy 152(b), at 171.
107. ld., Policy 161(a), at 176.
108. Id., Policy 162, at 176.
109. Id., Policy 161(c), at 176; id., General Provision 7, at 182-83.
110. For example, new projects in special communities are to "strengthen the
physical form of the community." S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the
addition of CAL. Put. RES. CODE § 30241(a); COASrAL PLAN, supra note 2, Policy 58(e),
at 78. It is hard to imagine what evidence would be relevant if a permit approval were
challenged as violating this policy. Presumably, attorneys for both sides would call
architects and city planners as experts to testify whether the proposed development
would strengthen or degrade the community's physical form. If so, these experts would
constitute another group of beneficiaries.
For examples of indefinite policies in the Regional Summaries, see notes 57-69
supra.
111. See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
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fornia's economic and intellectual elites. Their value preferences are
rather consistently reflected in the Plan's substantive policies.112  For
example, the design guidelines do not even attempt to disguise the
Commissioners' contempt for middle-American tastes: "Pre-set archi-
tectural styles (e.g., pseudo-Spanish mission and standard fast-food
restaurant designs) shall be avoided." '113 The "special communities"
singled out for preservation-e.g, La Jolla, Venice, Carmel, Mendo-
cino" 4-also tend to be the watering holes favored by those who can
afford to dislike mass-produced architecture.
The principal losers from enactment of the Coastal Plan would be
average California taxpayers and housing consumers. Demand for
housing along the coast is relatively inelastic because there is no close
substitute for that location. As a result, the Plan's restrictions on new
construction can be expected to increase sharply the price of both new
and used housing near the beach. Although definitive empirical
studies are not yet available, observers believe that supplementary state
land use controls in both Hawaii and California have in fact significantly
boosted housing prices." 5 The Coastal Plan's restrictions thus can be
expected to hurt, among others: (1) present coastal tenants (as their
landlords will be able to raise their rents); (2) those who will move
to the coastal area in the future; and (3) those who would otherwise
have settled in the coastal area but are now deterred from doing so
by high prices." 6 The beneficiaries of the higher housing prices will
be the landlords and homeowners who own existing coastal structures;
note, however, that the damage suffered by the third-mentioned group
of consumers is a deadweight loss of no benefit to landlords.
112. A large majority of the public representatives who have served on the State
and Regional Commissions have been either business executives, members of professions,
or academicians. See COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, at viii-x. One should not be
surprised that these representatives attempted to enhance the welfare of their own kind.
113. Id., Policy 51, at 73. See also S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing
the addition of CAL. PUn. Rks. CODE § 30231 (endorsing the design guidelines in the
Commission's Plan).
114. COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, Findings & Policy 58, at 77-78.
115. For the Hawaii experience, see F. BOssELMAN & D. CALLIs, THE QuinT
REVOLUION IN LANr UsE CONTROL 5-34 (1971).
In California, five county assessors testified before a state legislative committee that
in its first year, Proposition 20 had, in effect, substantially increased the values of
developed property along the coast, and probably caused a decline in the value of
undeveloped land. L.A. Times, Oct. 25, 1973, § 2, at 1, col. 5.
116. For a more formal explanation, see R. Ellickson, Suburban Controls on Urban
Growth: An Economic and Legal Analysis, Mar. 1976 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the author).
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The authors of the California Coastal Plan, without question a
well-intentioned sort, were not totally insensitive to the risk that they
might be accused of injuring housing consumers. They included sev-
eral policies aimed at ensuring that housing along the coastline would
be available to low- and moderate-income families.' 17  (This is
reminiscent of the OPEC nations granting foreign aid to under-
developed nations to mitigate hardships from high petroleum prices.)
The Commissioners' policy of priority treatment of housing for those
of modest income is disingenuous in several respects. First, given the
existing political opposition of the development lobby, it is inconceiv-
able that a coastal plan requiring communities like Cannel and Laguna
Beach to provide for subsidized housing could pass the legislature.""
Political necessity will compel approval of amendments to permit the
wealthier beach communities to veto subsidized housing projects; in
fact, the Plan probably already allows this. 11"9 Second, housing strate-
gists are increasingly asking that housing subsidies take the form of cash
allowances, not the administratively expensive, scandal-prone, project
subsidies which the Plan contemplates.120  The federal spigot on which
the Commissioners rely for deep housing subsidies may well be turned
off. Third, the Coastal Plan's proposed restrictions on the conversion
of apartments to condominiums and on the demolition of existing low-
priced housing units' will not protect modest renters in an area like
Venice. If the Commissioners succeed in stifling the supply of addi-
tional housing in places like the South Bay, Marina Del Rey, and
Malibu, the young professionals who want to live near the beach will
of necessity increasingly start looking for housing in the Venice area.
Venice landlords will then be able to raise their rents without making
improvements; they may also choose to upgrade their structures to cater
to a wealthier tenantry. Poor tenants in Venice would be damaged
either way.
117. See, e.g., COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, Policy 58, at 77-7,8 (preservation of
"special coastal communities" providing a "diversity of. . . housing opportunities"); id.,
Policy 126, at 156; id., General Provision 7(k), at 182.
118. See S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. PuB.
RFs. CODE § 30422 (1) requiring local coastal programs to contain a "low- and moderate-
income housing component. . . that assures an adequate amount of [subsidized] housing
. . . in new developments .... "); cf. COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, Policy 126(b), at
156; id., General Provision 7(k), at 182 (calling for a "significant amount" rather than
an "adequate amount" of such housing).
119. See text accompanying notes 86-95 supra.
120. See, e.g., H. AARON, SHELTER AND Stmsmins (1972).
121. S.B. 1579, § 1, Cal., 1975-76 Sess., proposing the addition of CAL. Pun. Rs.
CODE §§ 30276(a), (c); COASTAL PLAN, supra note 2, Policies 126(a), (c), at 156.
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There is no evidence that the Commissioners considered the
ultimate step---rent controls on coastal properties. Advocacy of that
policy would be a confession of the Plan's unfortunate effects on hous-
ing prices and would alienate some of the Plan's major beneficiaries,
coastal landlords.
The Plan's policies that are aimed at redistributing coastal wealth
to less advantaged groups suffer the usual drawbacks of in-kind housing
subsidies. Only an arbitrary fraction of the class of eligible beneficiaries
-poorer families-can be benefited, and much efficiency is inevitably
lost through administrative costs and the inalienability of the largess
provided. Working class voters, many of whom have a direct stake in
the construction industry, apparently are able to recognize that exclu-
sionary state land use planning is not in their interest; they led Utah
voters in rejecting a state land use program in a recent referendum.1
22
IV. THE BANKRUPTCY OF STATE MASTER PLANNING
Prior to voter approval of Proposition 20, coastal resources in
California were being managed primarily by: (1) private and public
landowners; (2) cities and counties (both of which are required in
California to engage in land use planning);12 3 and (3) a welter of
special-function state and federal agencies. Without question, the
management process was untidy and characterized by the muddling
through of problems. Those who drafted Proposition 20 had a very
low tolerance for untidiness. They called for the "precise, compre-
hensive definition of the public interest in the coastal zone,'124 and the
creation of a strongman agency to achieve it. In a world of perfect
information and infallible civil servants, this would be as good an
approach as any. But in the real world-where people hold sharply
conflicting values, where technological change outstrips the imagination
of science fiction writers, and where civil servants may be uninformed
or subject to corruption-the centralized master planning of the use of
widely scattered resources is likely to impair rather than augment
human welfare. Perhaps a passive State Coastal Agency acting as a
clearinghouse for information would enhance coastal efficiency; the
many anti-consumer policies in the Coastal Plan make it clear that an
agency with coercive powers certainly will not.
122. "Blue-blood Republican areas" in Utah favored the proposed measure. See
Dean, How to Kill a Land-Use Bill, PLANNING, Jan. 1976, at 22, 23.
123. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65300 (West 1966); id. § 65302 (West Supp. 1976).
124. CAL. PuB. R-s. CODE § 27304(a) (West Supp. 1976).
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The California Legislature could of course make the Plan more
palatable by deleting the most inefficient and elitist policies. Political
precedent indicates, however, that only a version that gives both local
and state agencies veto power over private development is likely to sur-
vive. In short, the only enactable state land use programs of general
application are undesirable ones. The recent trend toward greater
state land use planning is lmown among the cognoscenti as the "quiet
revolution in land use control."'12 Recent developments in other states
seem to indicate that the tide toward greater state control may be
reversing.126 Rejection of the California Coastal Plan by the California
Legislature would help turn the "quiet revolution" in its most promis-
ing direction: toward Thermidor.127
125. The phrase is drawn from F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLiES, THE QUIET REVo-
LUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971), which first described the emerging state
programs.
126. See notes 11, 122 and accompanying text supra (describing recent develop-
ments in Vermont, Maine, and Utah).
127. Thermidor:
[F. Thermidor, month of the Fr[ench] revolutionary calendar beginning July
19; fr[om] the overthrow of Robespierre which took place in that month in
1794]: a moderate counterrevolutionary stage following an extremist stage of
a revolution and usu[ally] characterized. . . by an emphasis on the restoration
of order, a relaxation of tensions, and some return to patterns of life held to
be normal.
Wnnsrnn's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcroNA Y (Unabr. ed. 1966).
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